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Abstrab- Network Mobility (NEMO) has gained much
momentum ever since being introduced. The concept of I\{EMO, is
actually building on top of the MIPv6 and using MIh6 as its
backbone. The difrerences are much align at the capability of the
Router being able to roam freely, hence the term Mobite Router(MR). Whereas in the MIPV6 world, there is only fix Access
Router (AR). Since the I\IEMO is directly associated with MIh/6
as the backbones building bloclis, the IIEMO concepts has also
inherits the security management systems of which MIpv6 is
adapting. As the matter of fact, the ITIEMO concept has exposed
greater security risks with the use of lpSec as the security design.
Coupled with nested tooping concept and capability tnai XgmO
offered, the use of IPSec as the security design will no longer be
sufficient from the efficiency point of view. ln this paper, we wlll
lllustrate the use of IPSec on Nf,MO, and zoomlng into tbe
instances whereby nested looping comes into picture and how
security system will be at risk and finally proposlng a new
security design system to counter the inelficiencies
Index Temt*t{etwork Mobitity (lyEMO), Mobile Network
Notes (MNN), Mobile Router (MR), Mobite Internet protocol
version 6 (MIPvd).
I. INrnooucnoN
EOR MIPv6, the basic communication model involvedI several mobile hosts (MFf. The Mobile Network Node(MNN) communicates to Correspondent Node (CN), which in
turn, is indeed another MN. The communication also involved
Home Agent (IIA) and Access Router (AR) tll. Ttre major
functionality of the AR in MIPv6, will merely be a router that
provides routing flrnctionality and being the gateway routing
for inbound and outbound IPv6 traffics. While the FIA
supports the MIPv6 protocol as playing the rule as the agent
that keep tracks on the whereabouts of MNNs when MNNs
roamed out away from the home network. All these protocol
had been described in details in [l].
While the technology evolved everyday, the thoughts of the
AR that would enjoy the mobility came into picture. The
conc€pt of 'lnoving router" will intoduce the idea of ..network
that moves" and hence the term NEMO is being established.
The NEMO inherited the concept of MIpv6 with the fact
that, the AR is on the mobility side and hence termed as MR
[2]. The functionality of IIA remains the same, so as the
security design ofusing IPSec as the core securitydesign. part
of the MR's responsibilities will also include the subnet
dishibution and managernen! ie: prefix delegation [7]. The
basic communication model for NEMO can best be illustrated
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Since the in&oduction of NEMO, there are more and more
new design oonc€pts being derived out tom NEMO, such as
the nested loop concep! prefix-delegation [7] and many more.
Nested Mobility [a] and other NEMO home network models
[3] are not the scope ofthis paper.
The NEMO protocol offers mobilrty and tansparcncy
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especially on the nested topology within a mobile network.
Current NEMO implementation that come with and MIFv6 as
the underlying carrier protocol suggested and in favor of the
deployment of IPSec with Security Association (SA), and
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) implementations. While
it is not wrong, showed in various solid desigrr specification on
the usage of IPSec in MIPv6 and NEMO, still there exist many
questions surrounding the use of IPSec. There are many
research papers, NEMO discussion forum as well as NEMO
working group already shown that the IPSec of NEMO had
intoduce inefficiency and design flaws [6], [8], [9]. The
NEMO security threats have also bear widely discussed as
being pointed out in [t3].
II. Pnoelsvl STATEMENT
For implementation of IPSec that enables MNN to o<change
data to HA or C\ the appropriate Security Association
Database (SAD) has to be available [l0l[11]. This also means
that a set of security policies called Security Associations
between two nodes that wish to communicate, will have to be
synchronized and going ttrru the protocol handshake. The SAD
may contain for instance a list of encrlrytion standards from l)
Advance Encryption Standard (AES); 2) Digital Encryption
Standard (DES); 3) Tripple DES (3DES) and with various
encryption algorithms such as Cipher Block Chaining (CBC),
Counter Mode Encryption with CBC-MAC authentication
(CCM), Electronic Code Book (ECB) and many more variants
[2]. For each algorithm to multiply with each encryption
standmds the SA database can be huge and hence for two
communication nodes that wish to converse and the process of
establishing and get the SA to slmc up to agreeing which
combinatiur of policies to be used, the process is expensive
and impact the performance ofthe system as a whole.
One of the problems of NEMO protocol is the performance
in security encrlrytion. For instance, MNN may have 4 sets of
SA while CN could have 5 sets (or more). For MNN to be able
to have conversation with CN, both sets of SA need to be
syncbronized. The computation overhead to synchronize
between 2 sets of SA will be expensive.
When we consider the security design with these entities and
topology in min4 it appears stongly that IPSec may not be the
best solutions to be deployed in terms of performances. The
involvement of IPSec in this case, may not yield efficiency in
terms of overall paformance.
Refer to Figure 2 for more illustative example, and imagine
that before MRI detached from its curent point of attachment,
this mobile network contained 2 nested mobile networks
within. Let us view that within these 2 nested mobile networks,
each ofthem contained a MNN2 and MNN3.
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When the MRI roamed into another point of attachment and
being given a different CoA and hence having another
different IPv6 prefixes, the nested mobile networks are
separated wittr the first nested network stalng still together
with the movement and the second nested network moved into
other domain. This situation is possible for instance due to the
better signal sfrength offered by MR3, of which the second
nested network physically and topologically closed to.
Nevertheless, the second nested network has turned into
Visiting MobileNode (Vlll}{) for MR3's mobile network.
Since the first nested network (MNN2) is still topologically
following its original mobile networks, the session
connectivity will still be similar in the sense of using similar
tunnels and hence ttre IPSec configuration would probably
have not changed too much (if IPSec is implemented). This is
because the MNN2 is still working under the same MRI prior
to the movement. In short, regardless of the movement the
second top level connection point (MR) is still the same.
Security Association configurations of [PSec protocol
processing overhead for changes may still be minimal.
However, this is not quite the same for MNN3 which is now
happened to have discovered that the MR would not be the
same MR of its original attached to. This discovery may in
turn figger a Fast Handover process and hence the associated
overheads. If the MNN3 is in the middle of communicating
with other CN, the changed of attachment will intoduce even
more overheads in terms of Fast l{andover processing. If
MNN3 was using SA of IPSec, the MNN3 will have to re-
initiate association process again simply because its MR has
been a different MR and hence the bi-directional trmnel will be
different. Recall that the bi-directional tunneling was
previously connected from MNN3-MRI and now it seemed to
be needed as for MNN3-MR3. Since the MNN3 prior to the
MR changed of MR's point of attachment has been using a
trusted tunnel, the MNN3 has no way could use the tunnel in
MR3 and still o<pecting the old security associatiqr (of the
first tunnel) configurations will work for the third tunnel. The
MRI bator mo{tl
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change of attachment here possibly will trigger a protocol to
detach the tunnel of MNN3-MNNI (old tunnel) and rhen
initiate a new attachment to MNN3-MR3. Or, establish another
secure tunnel from MNN3-MR3, and with this secure
hmneling (a separate set of IPSec+SA), re-twnel back to MRI
as the access connection. So in short, the communication path
fiom MNN3 would be like : MNN3-MR3(secure IpSec
tunnell)-MRl(Secure IPSec tunnel2>MR2-CN. This will
intoduce overheads in terms of protocol and encryptions.
The CN that the MNN3 was communicating with, will have
to re-negotiate a different set of security bindings, i.e.: the SA,
with MNN3 again. The CN will still yet to authenticate the
MNN3 (now at MR3) to ensure it is still a true MNN3 andnot
some malicious attacker from MR3,s tunnel trying to gain
access.
The situatim becorne worsen when there is multi levels and
multi layers of nested looping, where each layer of looping
will intoduce a sub.layer of re-tunneling wtren a MR roams.
Simple example as : if there is n level of MR attaching each
other and forming trmnels, upon detaching there will be n level
of detaching as well. Performance as in overall system will
hence be droppe4 and end-to-end tunnels policy maintenance
is expensive.
III. T:rs sot,r.rnoN
Roaming from one network to another one network has been
perceived to have protocol overheads as shown in the problem
section.
The main culprit behind this problem is the lpSec and the
Security Association. As elaborated, the grey area is still
existed on the re-binding or multiple bindings of the SA after
the NEMO movements at each level and typically in a multi
leveVlayer of nested loop.
A different solutiqr for security which do not particularly
need Security Association of IpSec would much be able to
resolve the issue and hence enhance the overall system
performance. The solution shall look into the area of
simpliffing the security management area especially that can
anticipate frequent roamlng and movements.
Our idea is to deploy a cenfialized binding system eg:
intoducing Certificate Authmity (CA) that is managed by
either application layer or by Intemet Service provider (ISp).
The key design conc€pt is that, how to keep the movement
mobility to the optimum without interrupting the existing
protocol. It appears that every time a movement is being
detected, the security portion (mainly the policy) will have to
change. This is like a tight ..border" or ..custom,' or
"immigration" conhol. That is, if we can introduce a border-
less control, by the means of using a cenfralized and trusted
database, with the main objective for authe,ntication purposes.
By doing this, whenever there is a movement occurrd there
will be no necessity of re-established tmneling.
Refer to Figure 3, the Public Key Infrastructure (pKI)
conc€pt can be deployed. The server is provided by ISp with
the similar concept of today's ISP. Applying the concept into
NEMO, MNN will have to register to ISP to use the service.
Just like today's mobile device (eg: PDA or mobile cell phone)
that wishes to use the service, the device will have to subscribe
to the service. The CA/Server will ttren provide PKI services
such as Public and Private key exchanges to the devices and
storing in the central and busted database.
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Whenever a MNN roarns, the MNN will need to talk to the
ISP/CA only when it needs to refresh the hivate Key
Exchange (PKE) kep. CIherwise there is not necessary to re-
establish any security policies or contacts. Without re-
establishing policies or contacts, there will be lesser overheads
on system protocol exchanges and heuce faster
communications.
IV. seNEHrs
In terms of security wise and the processing, if IPSec is
deployed, stronger encr5ptions may be available but with fie
fradeoffof more expensive computing power or cycles needed
on every roaming that causes new CoA being assigred If PKI
is being use, only simple block encryrption is needed and this
system's strength is maximizing ttre PubliciPrivate Key
Exchange mechanism to distribute a secret key (refer to Figure
4 on how this can be done).
Refer to Figure 4, below are the steps on how pKE
mechanism can be implemented:
I) The MR will request the Public Key of CN from a trasted
CA. This request will hove an association to Time (I).
2) CA responded to the MR by encrypting the message using
CA's private key. This way the MR can decrypt the message
using CA's public key which is openly ovailable. The message
contains CN's public key and the original request from MR,
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and the time stamp. This is lo allow MR compared the message
and hence authenticate the integrity of the message.
3) MR can then encrypt messqge (which is the RNI being
generated) with CN's public key. This message will contain the
MR's identifier as well.
4) CN decrypt the messa4;e using its own Private Key and
retrieve the MR's identifier as well as the RNI. CN will send
request to the trusted CA in order ta obtain MR's Public Kev".
This step is similar to how MR obtained CN's Public Key.
5) CA will pedorm identical process (similar to step 2) which
is to deliver MR's Public KeY to CN.
6) CN can now encrypt a new message to MR, containing the
RNI as well as newly generated Secret Key. Wen the message
arrived n MR,
7) By rcw the Secret Key has been securely shared between
MR ond CN and the further communicqtions done between MR
and CN will be via this symmetic encrption,
S) CN decrypt the message via the Secret Key and in return
will start using this Secret Key for further communications to
MR.
Legend:
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In short, step I to step 6 of Figure 4 are the core Public and
hivate Key exchange mechanism. After both commr:nication
devices had established *re trust between them, both can use
the channel to deliver a secret key for both to perform
encryption/decr]rption as shown in Step 6 and Step 8 of Figure
4. This c4ptography is using much simpler and much faster
symmetric encqptions.
Another benefits of using PKI is that, once the trust has been
establish, there will be no further needs of re-establishing and
re-agreeing the SA as being opposed in using IPSec; evan
ttrough the initial establishment of PKI may be expansive, such
as going thru the first 6 steps (as in Figwe 4) to obtain Public
and Private keys. However once the initial communication has
established, the MRI that roamed, do not have to re-setup or
tear down tunnels in order to re-establish secure tunnels and
hence this is also a big plus in nested loop scanario
As for implementation perspective, overhead on protocol
processing will be lesser with this new proposal.
For software coding perspective, the new proposal only
introduce several steps for initial PKI setup compared to huge
and complicated IPSec implementation.
Another advantage is that this proposal is using centalize
policies maintenance such as at ISP and not as proposed in the
standard of maintaining security policies (SA) at tunnel-to'
tunnel end point.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented the scenario of using IPSec as the security
desigrr especially with ttre involvement of SAD and ESP.
Coupled wittr the scenario of nested looping with multilayer
tunneling, the security desigrr exposed the &agility from the
point of efficiency and in the tenns ofperformance.
Currently, it is recommended to be using IPSec as the
primary security standards for MIPv6 ard NEMO. The IPSec
implementation gen€rates a huge arnoult of processing
overheads because IPSec requires both MN and CN (and hence
Mobile Router as well) to agree upon SA (Security
Association) which is a set of ancr5ption standards. The new
proposal will save the processing overhead temendously by
eliminating the need of IPSec's SA and ESP(Authentication
Header as well) and by introducing a simple Seoet Key
Encryption methodology with PKE mechanism.
Our solution of introducing a centalize binding systern such
as involving CA with PKI concept, will help to eliminate the
overloading computations of protocol and security
performance. Our solution starts with having CA as the cental
point of contolling communicatiurs and authenticatim. Once
the protocol has been established, the switch of using
symmetric encr;ption for data integlty protection will be able
to reduce the cost encr'lption trernendously. By eliminating the
needs of re-establishment for re-tunneling protocol encryption
processing overhead can be reduced and achieving greater
efficiency for overall performance.
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